Why did Hamas win?
Arguably, Hamas won because Palestinians were exasperated by Fatah's corruption and incompetence. Fatah's leaders, who run the PA since it was founded in 1993, have built a system of cronyism and nepotism which enriched few and left ordinary citizens living in dire conditions. Such a system was essentially based on the atomization of security forces. Having the monopoly of military force, the leaders of the security units acted as lords of territorial districts in the land administered by the PA, often fighting against each other for supremacy. Moussa Arafat, cousin of late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, is the latest famous victim of the power struggle between rival Palestinian factions that has been shattering the Palestinian Authority. Despite reiterated calls for reforms from the international community and donors, Fatah leaders and members always refused to comply.
Hamas, instead, has gained during the years a reputation as a clean, non-corrupt
party that is able to deliver results and solve problems. Hamas did what the
PA was expected to do: build schools and hospitals and provide social services.
Unsurprisingly, Hamas won local municipal elections held in 2005. The reason
is that Hamas members proved to be more effective administrators than Fatah's.
It is now expected to deliver.
Possible consequences. Palestinian Territories The first consequence of Hamas'
victory is that the group will not disarm. On the contrary, it will be entrusted
with the monopoly of force in the Territories. Arguably, reforming the security
apparatus will nonetheless be one of Hamas' toughest challenges. Hamas has its
own militia, but the PA's several security forces are dominated by Fatah's loyals.
When it forms the new government, Hamas will - in principle - also take over
the control of those security forces. How will Hamas integrate them? Unlike
Fatah, Hamas has a tight control over its militants. Will Hamas unify the PA's
security forces under its authority, paradoxically realising what the Fatah-led
PA failed to do? Or will Hamas integrate its own militia in the PA and keep
Fatah's security forces alive and exercise divide-and-rule control on them?
Israel In view of Israeli political elections to be held on March 28, observers
wonder whether Hamas victory will bring votes to the Likud to the detriment
of Kadima. In light of the recent shake up in Israeli politics and in the Israeli
society, however, this may not be the case. Israeli analysts suggest instead
that Kadima's unilateralism - which pledges for Israel to go ahead unilaterally
with territorial arrangements and set up its own borders - could be reinforced,
because of and as opposed to Likud's rigidity - which condition any withdraw
from the Territories to concessions by the Palestinians. With Hamas taking the
lead of Palestinian politics, waiting for concessions appears a more futile
prospect than before.
European Union The EU regards Hamas as a terrorist organization. Analysts suggest
that the EU will likely find a way to deal with the political wing of Hamas,
while shunning the armed militia wing. Rachel Bronson, senior fellow and director
for Middle East and Gulf studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, compares
the prospective dealing of the EU with Hamas to the way the EU deals with Hezbollah
in Lebanon: 'The Europeans are now actively reassessing their views on Hamas,'
Bronson says. 'I think they will look for a way to cooperate, and the Palestinians
will look for a way to keep European support.' In fact, Hamas is on one hand
dependent on international aid to realize its campaign promises to improve social
services in the Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, the EU committed a
great deal of political and financial resources to get the peace process back
on track after the withdrawal from Gaza.
Yet the EU may find it difficult to separate Hamas' political political wing
from the group's armed militias. It was precisely the impossibility to distinguish
between Hamas' two 'souls' that prompted the EU to put the Islamic Resistance
Movement in the black list of terrorist organizations in September 2003.
E.M. 31 - 1- 2006