Short
history of Iran's nuclear program
Index:
1. History
2. Allegations of illegal nuclear activities
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
3. EU Dialogue and EU-3 Diplomacy
4. Latest developments
1. History
The
Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program goes back to
many decades. The foundations for Iran's nuclear program
were laid in the 1960, within the framework of bilateral
agreements between Iran and the US. In 1968, Iran became
part to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) restricting
the possession of nuclear weapons (art.1) and preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons. After 1968, Iran's atomic agency was established
and plans were drawn by Shah Pahlavi - Iran's monarch -
to construct nuclear power stations across the country.
By 1975, the U.S. and Iran brokered the 'U.S.-Iran Nuclear
Cooperation', laying out the details of the sale of nuclear
energy equipment and other peaceful nuclear facilities .
In 1979
the Iranian Revolution broke out. The Revolution paralysed
the country's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations
with the West. With the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war (1980),
the nuclear program were stopped compeletely. It was not
restored until the conflict finished in 1988.
In 1990,
Iran began to look outwards for partners to revive its nuclear
aspirations; but, due to a radically different political
climate, few candidates existed. In 1995, however, Iran
signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the half
complete Bushehr plant, the only active plant in the country.
In 2001,
it emerged that Iran's most important nuclear facilities
were not at Bushehr, which can be monitored by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, but at clandestine sites under military
control. On August 14, 2002, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization
(MKO) , a dissident group dedicated to the overthrow of
the Islamic regime, revealed the existence of two secret
uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz and Arak.
2. Allegations
of illegal nuclear activities
Since
2003 the United States has claimed that Tehran is seeking
to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US has also
warned that Iran's uranium-enrichment program can easily
be adapted for military uses.
Further
to US allegations, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) started investigating as to whether the uranium enrichment
program, which is not in itself a violation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), conceals Iran's ambition
to acquire nuclear weapons, which is forbidden under the
NPT.
The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the
world's intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical
co-operation on nuclear technology; the agency also ensures
that such nuclear technology is employed only for peaceful
ends. The additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/540),
signed in May 1997, expands the IAEA's ability to check
for clandestine nuclear facilities by providing the agency
with more extensive investigatory means, such as visiting
any facility-declared or not as to investigate questions
or inconsistencies in a state's nuclear declarations.
Composed of 137 member states, the General Conference, the
IAEA is guided by the Board of Governors, gathering five
times a year, whose decisions are taken by consensus of
its Members. Among the decisions it can take, the Board
can reports any non-compliance member to the Security Council
and General Assembly of the United Nations. The Board deliberates
on a report of the Director General, who trasmits them the
findings of IAEA inspectors.
3. EU
Dialogue and EU-3 Diplomacy
Although
a dialogue between the EU and Iran was launched in 1995,
it was for the first time in 2001 that Brussels and Tehran
took practical steps to put bilateral ties and cooperation
in a contractual framework. On 19 November 2001, the European
Commission and the EU Council opened negotiations on a Trade
and Cooperation (TCA) agreement with Iran. During the negotiations,
the EU stressed that dialogue with Iran had to be sided
by concrete results in the areas of human rights, efforts
to counter terrorism, Iran's stance on the Middle East -
and most notably Israel -, and also on the non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction .
On 21
October 2003, foreign ministers of France, Germany and the
UK, and Mr. CFSP Javier Solana, labeled EU3 and hailed as
the first case of high profile EU-led initiative, visited
Teheran. With the signing of the 'Tehran declaration', the
Iranian government agreed to sign and ratify the 1997 Additional
Protocol to Non-Proliferation Treaty and voluntarily suspend
its uranium enrichment and processing activities. The EU
offered to accelerate the path of EU-Iran economic cooperation,
namely, to encourage investments in Iran's oil industry,
to provide specific security guarantees, and to support
Iran to its bid to join the World Trade Organization.
In 2004,
Iranian diplomats complained that Europe had failed to deliver
incentives that would encourage Iran to modify their nuclear
goals. In addition, as domestic political conditions evolved,
Iran grew increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of giving
up what they saw as their sovereign right to enrich uranium.
However, negotiations continued. The EU3 and Iran met in
Paris, in November 2004. The Paris Agreement, signed under
the auspices of the IAEA, called on Iran to temporarily
suspend all uranium-enrichment activities during negotiations
over the long-term fate of its nuclear program. However,
since spring 2005, Iran became increasingly dissatisfied
with the EU's failure to deliver. It also indicated that
it intended to break the terms of the Paris Agreement, reaffirming
its right to enrich uranium for peaceful programs.
On 15
May 2005, Iran's conservative-dominated parliament passed
a resolution backing the government's right to enrich uranium.
4. Latest
developments
Following
Iranian recent presidential elections of 17 June 2005, which
was won by Iran's Conservatives, the situation evolved rapidly.
On 8
August 2005, the Iranian government turned down an offer
of economic incentives by France, Britain and Germany and
resumed its conversion of uranium at the Isfahan facility.
The latter's activities had been suspended under the November
2004 Paris agreement. UK, France and Germany declared they
would ld consider referring Iran and its nuclear program
to the UN Security Council.
On the
sidelines of the UN 2005 World Summit, 14 -16 September
2005, Iran's nuclear problem was at the centre of negotiations.
The
US administration embarked on a series of face-to-face meetings
with world leaders to try to isolate Iran diplomatically
over Iran's push to expand its nuclear programme. The US
concedes that 'Iran has the right to have a nuclear programme
for civilian purposes' but 'with limits', namely the Iranians
should not have the means to acquire the necessary expertise
for uranium enrichment. France maintained that 'if a State
fails in its obligations under the NPT, it is legitimate
for the matter to be referred to the Security Council once
all dialogue has been exhausted' .
On Sunday
18 September Reuters reported that EU officials were working
on a resolution in the International Atomic Energy Agency
to report Iran to the Security Council. European diplomats
said that the likelihood of a UN referral had increased
after Tehran showed it had no intention of serious negotiation
on Saturday.
Therefore,
during next IAEA meeting, scheduled for Monday 19 September
2005, the IAEA's EU members of the Board of Governors could
decide that Iran is in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and other agreements, and to refer Iran's case
to the UN Security Council for possible political or economic
sanctions .
On 24
September Iran rejected the resolution of the IAEA Board.
Drafted by Germany, France and the United Kingdom (EU3)
and approved by 22 votes, 12 abstentions (including China
and Russia) with a vote against from Venezuela, the resolution
condemns Tehran for having breached its commitments to the
IAEA by converting uranium.
It does
not make any express demand to go to the Security Council
at this stage but establishes conditions for later transfer.
Jack
Straw declared that, 'My European colleagues and I have
listened carefully to the concerns of our international
partners that we should allow more time for negotiations.
That is why we agreed that a report to the Security Council
by the IAEA would not be made immediately. I hope Iran will
take this opportunity to meet the concerns expressed by
the Board: the European side for its part is prepared to
resume negotiations within the framework agreed between
the Europeans and Iran last November'.
On 30
November 2005 IAEA's Board of Governors is going to decide
whether to transfer the Iranian dossier to the UN Security
Council.
Updated 6 November 2005
