The EU-Syria Association Agreement
Date 25 - 5- 2004
Introduction
· After finalising negotiations in December 2003, the EU is to sign an Association Agreement with Syria in Spring 2004. The last country yet to sign this bilateral agreement in the framework of the Euromediterranean Partnership, Syria is arguably also the most interesting. This paper casts light on several issues the EU may wish to consider whilst pondering the strengthening of links with the hereditary Arab republic
1. Human rights, democracy and rule of law
· Association Agreements stipulate that ‘relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of this Agreement itself, shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of [the agreements]’[1]. The EU could and should thus provide some concrete and credible incentives for Syria to comply with these provisions, as the record of state in terms of individual freedoms and democracy remains difficult. A western diplomat said the reforms can proceed at a ‘much greater pace,’ adding that ‘reforms are not executed in an integrated and united way, and do not cover all basics. This is a real problem […]. They try at great effort to carry out the economic, social and administrative reforms but it seems that they step one pace forward for two backward’[2]
· In February 2001 the Syrian government put an end to what had been termed ‘Damascus Spring’, a period when independent discussion fora had appeared tolerated by the regime of President Bashar Assad. An escalating campaign of threat, intimidation and harassment against reformists was then launched[3] and the ten most prominent Syrian pro-democracy activists[4] - including two independent members of parliament, two lawyers, a prominent economist, and two medical doctors - were arrested during August and September 2001, and sentenced in 2002 to prison terms of two to ten years. The Brussels director of Human Rights Watch, Lotte Leicht, declared ‘the Syrian government has cracked down hard on advocates of political reform, human rights, and civil society’, and that ‘the EU must send a clear message that such actions are unacceptable and will have consequences’[5]
· The European Parliament passed in June 2003 a resolution on Syria expressing grave concern at the imprisonment of intellectuals and opposition figures. It called on the authorities to ensure that detainees were not tortured or ill-treated and to ratify and implement the UN Convention against Torture[6]. However, the Commission did not make the finalisation of negotiations conditional upon the release of imprisoned activists and respect for human rights or individual freedoms
· More than 1,500 Syrian intellectuals, writers and lawyers have recently signed a petition demanding the authorities to make political reforms in Syria[7], including the lift of the state of emergency imposed in the country since 1963. The signatories of the petition stressed the need for abrogating ‘all emergency and extraordinary trials, and to halt all oppressive detention, and to release all political detainees and detainees of the opinions, and to compensate for and restoring back dignity for those who are deprived from their civilian rights for political reasons’
· The organisers intended to submit this petition to the Syrian authorities on the occasion of the Baath party assumption of the authority in Syria on 8 March 2004. However, on that day activists were dispersed while peacefully marching in front of the Parliament in Damascus. According to the BBC, seven people were arrested including the leaders of the march. The crowd was dispersed by policemen and security police who outnumbered the protestors. Banners were not allowed to be raised and the show of force by the government silenced the crowd, which hoped that the success of this march will be the beginning of other civil disobedience activities. The head of the Committees for the Defence of Human Rights in Syria himself, Aktham Naisse (Nueisah), was detained along with several others[8], including Mr. Matthew Lersel, a third secretary stationed in the US Embassy in Damascus[9].
· On 13 April 2004, Aktham Naisse was detained by Syrian military secret services and transferred from his home in Latikia to a military secret service station in Damascus charged with ’carrying out activities contrary to the socialist system of the state’ and ‘opposing the objectives of the revolution’[10]. Mr. Naisse also suffers from hearth and kidney problems and needs daily medicine treatment that Syrian authorities did not provide. Naisse had a stroke four days after he was detained. Hospitalised, with half of his body paralysed, he is now unable to walk and to speak properly, and sits in a 2 metre square cell with common criminals. His health deteriorates, and his supporters fear he will disappear like other Syrian citizens, or die in dire conditions[11].
· This last episode seems to confirm the conclusions included in the 2003 US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices, which stressed the powerful role of the security services, extending beyond strictly security matters, due to the state of emergency in place since 1963. The report further stated that ‘the Government prevented any organized political opposition, and there have been very few anti-government manifestations. Continuing serious abuses included the use of torture in detention; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; and infringement on privacy rights. The Government significantly restricted freedom of speech and of the press. Freedom of assembly does not exist under the law, and the Government restricted freedom of association. […] The Government placed some limits on freedom of religion and freedom of movement. Proselytizing by groups it considered Zionist was not tolerated. Violence and societal discrimination against women were problems. The Government discriminated against the stateless Kurdish minority, suppressed worker rights, and tolerated child labor in some instances’[12]. These conclusions are confirmed by major human rights NGOs, including Amnesty International[13], Human Rights Watch[14] and Freedom House[15]
· On 12 and 14 March 2004, 14 Kurds were killed by the Syrian police during some clashes in Qameshli in northern Syria[16]. After these events, a number of exiled Kurds expressed its resentment and dissatisfaction with the current regime demonstrating in front of Syrian diplomatic representations in Brussels and Geneva and marching in Germany, Turkey, Belgium and Switzerland to raise awareness of the incident[17]. Syria’s autocratic power perceives the Kurdish minority as a threat and consequently assigns no say in politics and no social or cultural rights to Kurds
· Despite such violations of basic freedoms, the European Commission sent Commissioner for Energy, Loyola de Palacio, to Syria and Lebanon from 13 to 16 May to discuss Syria's integration into the region's oil market, its transit role between the EU and Egypt, together with Iraq's oil and gas resources, and the liberalisation of the Syrian electricity market, and integration into the Mediterranean market[18]. De Palacio met with Assad, Syrian Prime Minister, Mohammed Naji Otri and Syria’s ministers for oil, electricity and transport - at a time when Naisse had been imprisoned for calling for democratic reforms, and had been provided with no medical or legal assistance.
· Despite the many problematic areas within the country, the European Commission negotiated the Association Agreement without adequately addressing the issue that Syrian citizens do not have the right to change their government, which uses extensive powers to prevent any organised political opposition[19] through documented intimidation, the criminal prosecution of leading activists, and imprisonment[20]. Restrictions of freedom of speech and of the press, the non-existence of freedom of assembly and harsh restrictions on freedom of association further affect the country’s human rights record. Syria remains a closed country for HR organisations. Amnesty International last had official access in 1997 and Human Rights Watch in 1995, and the government did not reply to written requests for access from both these organisations[21]
2. Support for terror organisations
· Support provided to terror organisations is also a factor the European Commission may have wished to take into consideration in its dealings with Syria. Although Syria collaborated with the US in investigating al-Qaida, Damascus continued to offer political and material support to Palestinian groups, allowing these to maintain headquarters or offices in Damascus, whilst alleging that these Damascus offices undertake political and informational activities only. Syria also reports that activities of these groups constitute legitimate resistance and not acts of terror, a view it has promoted at the UN Security Council and in other multilateral fora[22]
· The most notable of hardline Palestinian rejectionist groups in Syria are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)[23]. All of these are included in the EU blacklist of terror organisations[24]
· Furthermore, the Lebanese social terror group, Hezbollah, receives extensive diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria[25]. Syria serves as the primary transit point for the transfer of Iranian-supplied weapons to Hezbollah[26]. Hezbollah’s training camps remain based in Syria,[27] and in Syrian-occupied Lebanon[28]. Furthermore, Hezbollah is extensively cited to be involved in the drugs trade in Syrian-occupied Lebanon as a funding instrument for their terror activities[29]. Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad are included among the 12 organisations listed in the Department of State's October 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organisations as having links to drug trafficking[30]
3. Syrian influence on Lebanon
· Syria is able to support Hezbollah through its long-term control of Lebanon. About 16,000 Syrian troops are stationed in Lebanon and are mainly based east of Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley[31], together with an unknown number of ‘Moukhabarat’ (or military intelligence). Syria has control over all aspects of Lebanon’s political life, and interferes in all forms of Lebanese daily life[32]. The 128-member parliament, elected in September 2000, follows the Syrian line on internal and regional affairs, and the judiciary is determined by Syrian political influence, which affects the appointments of key prosecutors and investigating magistrates[33]
· The Syrian-backed Lebanese governments have been suppressing civil liberties from control of the media to attacks on political and individual freedoms, including: freedom of speech, assembly, the right to demonstrate, the right to form political association, and through the use of phone tapping, arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, torture and death by torture[34], forced confessions[35], prevention from access to proper legal counsel, and the excessive use of military courts.[36] Independent Arab journals have routinely condemned Syrian abuses in Lebanon
· Syrian-supported radical organisations, including the Palestinian factions and Hezbollah, have subjugated instruments of the state through paramilitary activities including the detention of suspects and the administration of justice in areas they control, generally without any due process safeguards[37]
4. Links with Iraq
· Syria’s credibility as a partner may also be questioned on the grounds of its past links with the regime led by Saddam Hussein. Despite the deeply-rooted mutual distrust once existing between the two countries[38], Syria drew upon Iraqi crude oil, in violation of United Nations sanctions, as a means of feeding its refineries and freeing up more of its own oil for export[39]. A Syrian industry source indicates that the country was receiving 150,000 barrels a day (bpd) of Iraqi crude through a pipeline reopened after 18 years for the purpose of moving the smuggled Iraqi oil[40]. The pipeline was shut down by US troops in April 2003[41]
· Furthermore, Syria did not prevent hundreds of militant Muslim militias from crossing its desert border into Iraq to participate in attacks on coalition troops, as Syrian foreign minister Farouq al-Shara has admitted[42]. Syria is also believed to have withheld frozen Iraqi bank accounts, estimated to amount to $3 billion[43], which the US is seeking to be returned to Iraq[44]
5. Chemical and biological weapons
· The Syrian chemical and biological arsenal may also be of interest to the EU. In the late 1970s and 1980s, Syria increased its WMD potential through technical knowledge obtained from the Soviet Union (later the Russian Federation), West Germany, France, and Iran[45], and is now believed to hold the most advanced chemical and biological weapons arsenal in the Middle East. Its chemical and biological weapons capabilities are most formidable than those of any Arab state[46], exceeding even those of Iran[47]. Syria has two large underground missile production facilities near Aleppo and Hama, built with Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese assistance, and jointly produces Scud-C and Scud-D missiles with Iran[48]
· All types of Scud missiles are designed to carry, along with conventional warheads, chemical and biological warheads and nearly all of the missiles in the Syrian inventory, covering every range and payload, chemical or biological weapons[49]. Some missiles are equipped with chemical warheads that Syria produces independently. Syria is considered to spend between $1 billion and $2 billion annually on its ballistic, chemical and biological capabilities, an enormous share of the Syrian military budget[50]
· To add to the deterrent power of the missiles, Syria has moved to acquire the nerve gas VX, with the intention of deploying it in missile-borne warheads. In contrast to sarin, VX has a high persistence and is much more lethal when encountered through the respiratory system and skin. Syrian production of VX reportedly takes place in plants located near Hama and Homs[51]
· In the first part of 2003, Syria continued to seek chemical weapons-related precursors from different sources. Damascus reportedly already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents[52]. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical weapons program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment
· The Syrian biotechnological infrastructure is being developed through the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in Damascus, which has taken the scientific lead through its biological department. Syrian attention has been focused primarily on two bacterial agents, anthrax and cholera, as well as two toxins, botulinum and ricin[53]
6. Drugs trafficking
· Syria is considered to be one of the significant countries in the Middle East region for drug trafficking[54]. The country is an important transit point for opiates and hashish from Lebanon and Turkey bound for regional and Western markets[55]. Cocaine also enters Syria from Latin America en route to Lebanon for processing and re-routing to Western Europe and North America[56]
· Syria is also a base for fenethylline, a synthetic amphetamine-variant stimulant commonly known by the trademark name Captagon, and one of the most popular drugs of abuse among young affluent populations in the Middle East. Captagon is smuggled from primary production areas in southern Europe through Syria and Jordan to the Arabian Peninsula. In September 2002, INTERPOL notes that more than 1.4 million tablets were seized in Syria while en route to Saudi Arabia[57]
7. Conclusion: Syria and the EU-US divide
· The Association Agreement connotes the disparity between EU and US foreign policy approaches towards Damascus: Europe believes Syria’s repressive political structure might be ‘neutralised with an embrace’ through international agreements, which seek to foster closer economic and political ties, as a means to enhance progressive governance within the Assad-run state
· However, the EU approach has been scrutinised by human rights organisations, which have highlighted how the EU and its member states ‘did not undertake vigorous public advocacy on behalf of beleaguered Syrian advocates of human rights and political reform,’ and criticised the EU for not setting the unconditional release of pro-democracy activists as a benchmark for further negotiations in their conclusion of the Association Agreement[58]. The EU's unwillingness to push for internal reforms in Syria prompted the late EU Ambassador to Syria, Marc Pierini, to openly admit ‘our record is a mixed one’[59]. As Michael Curtis, spokesman for the European Commission, adds, ‘We regret that the promising start of Bashar Al-Assad's presidency in the human rights field came to a halt in 2001 when a number of opposition personalities were arrested’[60]
· Doubts regarding the EU approach are also shared by Syrians abroad striving to achieve democratic reforms within their country. Mr. Farid Ghadry, president of the Washington-based Reform Party of Syria, declared to the European Institute for Research on the Middle East that ‘RPS views the Association Agreement with scepticism because while it meets the criteria for a good peace of legislation on trade, it falls short on WMD, human rights, and the occupation of Lebanon. Syria always complained about the occupation of the Golan Heights by Israel but it remains silent about its occupation of a whole country such as Lebanon’
· However, despite growing critical voices, the EU continues to pursue its expanding ties with Syria, in contrast to the US, which has viewed the Syrian government as a threat to regional peace. Terrorism, counter-terrorism, and weapons-related issues have lately dominated the Bush administration's agenda with Syria[61]. The US approved the ‘Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003’, specifically drafted ‘to halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, and stop its development of weapons of mass destruction, and by so doing hold Syria accountable for the serious international security problems it has caused in the Middle East’[62]. This act foresees to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions in cases of non-compliance, but some provisions guarantee President Bush broad powers to waive penalties if he deems this ‘in the national interest’. Members of the US Congress said the sanctions reflected a sense that Syria had gone so far in its support of terror that only strong measures were applicable[63]
· In contrast, Emma Udwin, spokeswoman for EU External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, declared on 9 October 2003 that ‘the policy of isolating Syria is not the most productive’[64]. Accordingly, on 9 December 2003, Christian Leffler, EU negotiator and Deputy Head of the Private Office of Relex Commissioner Chris Patten, declared to have covered all the areas to be included in the Association Agreement and to have found compromises and agreement in all these areas, adding that he saw no direct link between the breakthrough and possible US sanctions: ‘We have been negotiating a long-term partnership......it cannot be based on such developments’[65]. After the finalisation of negotiations, Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, declared that the agreement ‘will provide a solid platform for the EU to support Syrian efforts to carry out political and economic reform. The clauses that the agreement includes regarding respect for human rights, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and fight against terrorism, will enhance our ability to engage with Syria on these important issues’[66]
· The US/EU divergence on Syria appears symptomatic of a wider difference in transatlantic strategic culture. The gap in power of action between the EU and the US has ultimately shaped the respective strategic cultures of each,[67] and has made the US approach appear more pragmatic in that it provides incentives for compliance by showing that non-compliance has a very high opportunity cost in terms of diplomatic and economic consequences. Syria’s support by proxy for terror organisations, involvement in drugs trafficking, its advanced chemical weapons arsenal, occupation of Lebanon and widespread internal and external human rights abuses contravene the usual terms of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements,[68] and make its case quite exceptional. If the EU-Syria Association Agreement achieves its ambitious objectives- and effectively tackles the areas above- it will be deemed one of the biggest successes of EU foreign policy. To this end, close monitoring of the issues, and vigilant public scrutiny with regard to the implementation of this agreement will be paramount if the EU approach to the Middle East area is to be properly evaluated
Last updated: 25 May 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] The European Commission's Delegation to Syria, Towards an EU-Syria Association Agreement
http://www.delsyr.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_syria/eu_syr_association_agreement.htm
See also for example the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/lebanon/aa/1.pdf
[2] http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040221/2004022114.html
[3] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003 – Syria http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/syria.htm
[4] Human Rights Watch, Crackdown On Democracy Advocates In Syria, New York, 6 April 2002 http://hrw.org/press/2002/04/syria040602.htm
[5] Human Rights Watch, EU Should Support Syria’s Imprisoned Democrats, Brussels, 18 September 2002 http://hrw.org/press/2002/09/syria0918.htm
[6] Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2003 – Sirya http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Syr-summary-eng
[7] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3480449.stm and http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040206/2004020602.html
[8] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3543029.stm
[9] http://www.reformsyria.com/documents/US%20calls%20Syria%20detention%20of%20diplomat%20unacceptable.pdf
[10] http://news.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE240372004
[11] http://news.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE240262004?open&of=ENG-SYR
[12] http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27938.htm
[13] Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2003 – Sirya http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Syr-summary-eng
[14] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003 – Syria http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast7.html
[15] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003: Country and Related Territory Reports – Syria http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/syria.htm
[16] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3508710.stm
[17] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513960.stm
[18] http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/637&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
[19] BBC News, Country profile: Syria http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/801669.stm
[20] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003 – Syria http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast7.html
[21] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003 – Syria http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast7.html
[22] US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2002 Middle East Overview, 30 April 2003 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19986.htm
[23] US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2002, 30 April 2003 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/pdf/
[24] http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/dec/77217.pdf
[25] US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2002 - Appendix B: Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 30 April 2003 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19991.htm
[26] US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2002, Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism, 30 April 2003
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19988.htm
[27] Rachel Ehrenfeld, Operation Syria, 2nd May 2003 http://public-integrity.org/publications33.htm
[28] http://www.reformsyria.com/syria%20today/syria_terrorism.htm
[29] U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists & Your Kids, A National Symposium on Narco-Terrorism, 4 December 2001 http://www.usdoj.gov/deam/ongoing/syposium_transcript.doc and Council on Foreign Relations, Narcoterrorism http://www.terrorismanswers.com/terrorism/narcoterrorism.html
[30] http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct032002.html#1
[31] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html
[32] http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/lebanon.htm and Joseph Gebeily, Lebanon - The Road To Democracy, Presentation at The Hudson Institute, 7 March 2003 http://www.licus.org/liclib/roadtodemocracy.htm
[33] http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/lebanon2.htm
[34] http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Lbn-summary-eng
[35] http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/lebanon2.htm
[36] http://www.licus.org/liclib/roadtodemocracy.htm
[37] http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/countryratings/lebanon2.htm
[38] Iraq Crisis Bulletin, History Of The Iraq-Syria Relationship, 17 April 2003 http://www.iraqcrisisbulletin.com/archives/041703/html/history_of_the_iraq-syria_rela.html
[39] CNN.com, Iraqi oil pipeline to Syria challenging U.N. sanctions, 19 December 2000 http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/12/19/energy.syria.iraq.reut/
[40] http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/12/19/energy.syria.iraq.reut/
[41] CBC News, U.S. troops stop Iraqi oil to Syria, 15 April 2003 http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/04/15/Syria_powell030415
[42] David Harrison, Syria threatens to attack Golan settlers if Israel strikes again, The Sunday Telegraph, 26 October 2003, and Don Van Natta Jr. and Desmond Butler, Hundreds of militants head to Iraq for jihad, IHT, 3 November 2003 http://www.iht.com/articles/116070.html
[43] CNN.com, Source: Saddam's money may be in Syria, 13 October 2003 http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/13/sprj.irq.saddam.money/
[44] The Jerusalem Post, 'Syria wants a different kind of relationship', 20 November 2003 http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1069304432293
[45] Dany Shoham, Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons, The Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2002, Volume IX: Number 3 http://www.meforum.org/article/493
[46] Dany Shoham, Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent, The Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2002, Volume IX: Number 4 http://www.meforum.org/article/510
[47]The Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/article/493
[48]The Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/article/510
[49] See http://www.meforum.org/article/510
[50] View amongst others, http://www.meforum.org/article/493
[51]The Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/article/510#_ftn8
[52] CIA, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003 http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#7
[53] http://www.meforum.org/article/510#_ftn12
[54] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Country Map and Statistics – Syria - Overview of the Drug Control Situation
http://www.unodc.org/egypt/en/country_profile_syria.html
[55] CIA, The World Factbook – Syria http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sy.html
[56] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Country Map and Statistics – Syria - Overview of the Drug Control Situation
http://www.unodc.org/egypt/en/country_profile_syria.html
[57] US Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Intelligence Brief - Fenethylline And The Middle East: A Brief Summary, September 2003 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/03046/03046.html
[58] http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast7.html
[59] Iason Athanasiadis, Critical engagement, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, Issue No.588, 30 May - 5 June 2002 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/588/re9.htm
[60] http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/588/re9.htm
[61] http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast7.html
[62] Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c108:./temp/~c108T35j6f
[63] Brian Knowlton, Europe Criticizes U.S. Move to Impose Sanctions on Syria, International Herald Tribune, 10 September 2003 http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/998360/posts
[64] EUbusiness.com, EU says won't follow US sanctions move on Syria, 9 October 2003 http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/031009121332.vlg0itzr and Brian Knowlton, Saying U.S. approach to Syria isn't working, EU seeks cooperation, IHT, 10 October 2003 http://www.iht.com/articles/113157.html
[65] http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/370538.html
[66] The European Commission's Delegation to Syria, Conclusions of Negotiations of EU-Syria Association Agreement, 10 December 2003 http://www.delsyr.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/detail.asp?id=40
[67] Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 8 April 2003 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=188706
[68] European Commission, EU-Syria: Conclusion of the Negotiations for an Association
Agreement, IP/03/1704 - Brussels, 10 December 2003 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/syria/intro/ip03_1704.htm